In a coalitional two-sided matching problem agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who -when matched -form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents' preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings.
Introduction
Both hedonic coalition formation and matching models have been used to study a wide range of real-life situations. While the coalition formation literature focuses on the formation of groups on one side of a market -political parties forming government, athletes forming teams, students forming student groups, researchers forming research teams, medical professionals forming medical practices -the matching literature investigates the "matching" of entities on both sides of a market, e.g., students choosing colleges, researchers choosing universities, patients choosing medical centers, medical interns choosing hospitals, etc. Many of these situations are, however, intrinsically interrelated: student groups and research teams when matched form universities; athletes form teams who match with a team of managers to form a sport club; and medical practitioners together with their patients comprise hospitals. For this reason, in this paper we integrate coalition formation and matching problems into a novel framework, which we call a coalitional matching problem. This allows us to analyze stability in two-sided matching problems where agents on each side of the market simultaneously form coalitions and "match" to coalitions on the other side.
Our work is immediately related to the literature on two-sided matching problems, where agents on one side of the market are matched to institutions on the other side, first defined by Gale and Shapley (1962) . Their seminal contribution spurred a vast body of literature (for a thorough review, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) ). Among the key contributions, we note Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Crawford and Knoer (1981) , who extend Gale and Shapley's framework to a transferable utility setting; Kelso and Crawford (1982) , who provide sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable allocations; and Blair (1988) , who proves that under a suitable ordering the set of stable matchings is a lattice. More recently, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) incorporate contracts in the analysis.
In this line of research it has also been recognized that agents' preferences over matchings may depend not only on the institutions they are matched with, but also on the other agents that are matched to the same institution, i.e., their colleagues. For example, the early study by Roth (1984) , and the recent one by Klaus and Klijn (2005) , investigate many-to-one matching problems in the presence of couples on the agent side of the market.
In these models, however, the coalitions, i.e., the couples, are exogenously given. Dutta and Massó (1997) take the analysis one step further and study a many-to-one matching model in which agents' preferences are lexicographic and are defined over all institutions and all subsets of colleagues. These authors, however, restrict their analysis to situations in which institutions' preferences over agents satisfy a substitutability property, an assumption which might not be applicable to many real-life situations in which there are complementarities between agents as argued most recently by Pycia (2007) . Pycia (2007) and Revilla (2007) move away from the lexicographic preferences assumption in the many-to-one matching problem with peer effects. In this respect, their contributions can be regarded as hedonic coalition formation problems with heterogeneous sets of actors: a set of institutions and a set of agents; and a restriction on the coalition structures such that a coalition may contain at most one institution. In a related piece of work, Echenique and Yenmez (2007) propose an algorithm to find a core stable matching, when it exists, in the general many-to-one matching problem with peer effects. To conclude this brief overview of the literature, we would like to mention that Dutta and Massó (1997) , Pycia (2007) , and Revilla (2007) all contain, under different names, a condition that imposes a degree of commonality of players' preferences over groups. As it will turn out, the spirit of commonality of players' preferences will be important for the analysis in this paper, too.
In this paper we depart from the existing literature, most notably, by allowing at the same time coalition formation on both sides of the market and matching between two coalitional entities. Throughout the paper we illustrate our concepts by considering a two-sided matching problem where students may form student groups and researchers may collaborate within research teams who when matched form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over research teams he would like to work in (and thus, a research team formation game is well defined) and over student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over groups of students she wants to study with (and thus, a student group formation game is well defined, too) and over groups of researchers she would like to learn from. In this setup, we study the existence of core stable coalitional matchings.
In our model, we consider lexicographic preference profiles as they allow us to clearly demarcate the coalition formation and matching aspects of the problem. Within this broad category, a first possibility is to assume that the agents' preferences over groups on one market side dictate their overall preferences over universities. In this case, if the market side coincides with an agent's own market side, then the existence of core stable partitions of students and researchers into student groups and research teams 1 is necessary and sufficient for the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. If, on the other hand, the market side is the same for all agents, then the existence of core stable coalitional matchings is completely determined by the existence of core stable partition of the agents on that side of the market. If students judge universities according to their corresponding teaching teams and researchers judge universities according to their corresponding student groups, then a common ranking property (cf. Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) ) assures the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. Another possibility to induce agents' preferences over universities is to assume that priority is given to groups on one of the market sides and then, in case of indifference, groups on the other market side also play a role. As it turns out, the exis-tence of core stable coalition structures for the coalition formation games on the distinct market sides is again necessary and sufficent for the existence of a core stable coalitional matching provided that agents' preferences in the coalition formation games are strict and agents give priority to groups from their own side. Depending on whether agents give priority to groups on one and the same market side, or to groups from the opposite market side, we show that the existence of core stable coalitional matchings requires appropriate selections from the following two properties (in addition to the core stability on the distinct market sides). The first one is the total balancedness of the corresponding coalition formation games (cf. Bloch and Diamantoudi (2007) ) requiring each restriction of these games to have a non-empty core. Although this condition is quite restrictive, many of the sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core of hedonic games guarantee that the game is in fact totally balanced (e.g., the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) and the top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001)). The second property makes the existence of core stable coalitional matchings dependent on whether individual preferences respect a common ranking over research teams and a common ranking over student groups. The interplay among these properties determines the structure of the results presented in the main body of our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic concepts used in our analysis. Sections 3, 4, and 5 are devoted to the existence of core stable coalitional matchings when agents' preferences over universities are crucially shaped by their preferences over groups, respectively, on their own market side, on one and the same market side, on the opposite market side. Each of these sections contains existence results with respect to the outlined induced preferences and provides examples that shed light on the importance of the identified (necessary and ) sufficient conditions. We conclude in Section 6 with some final remarks. An appendix contains the proofs of all formal statements.
Notation and definitions
Our setup consists of the following basic ingredients.
Agents and overall preferences
There are two disjoint and finite sets of agents, the set R of researchers, and the set S of students. A research team T is a non-empty subset of R and a student group G is a non-empty subset of S. We denote by 2 R the set of all research teams, and by R r the set of all teams containing researcher r ∈ R. Correspondingly, 2 S stands for the set of all student groups, while S s is the set of all student groups containing student s ∈ S.
Each researcher and each student seek a research/teacher team and a student group. Thus, each student s ∈ S has a complete and transitive preference s defined over 2 R × S s , and each researcher r ∈ R has a complete and transitive preference r defined over R r × 2
S
. The corresponding strict preference and indifference relations are denoted, for i ∈ R ∪ S, by i and ∼ i , respectively.
Primitive preferences
We assume that each agent's overall preference over universities, i.e., over elements of 2 R × 2 S that contain him, are induced by two corresponding primitive binary relations (assumed to be complete and transitive). More precisely, for each s ∈ S, these relation are G s (defined over student groups containing s) and T s (defined over all research teams). Correspondingly, for each r ∈ R, the relations are T r (defined over all research teams containing r) and G r (defined over all student groups). The different ways in which this primitive information is used to guide agents' overall preferences shape the domains we consider in the following sections.
Common rankings
For some of the results in the next sections to hold we need to assume the existence of a common ranking, i.e., a complete and transitive binary 
Hedonic games
In a hedonic coalition formation game each player's preferences over coalitions depend only on the composition of members of his coalition (cf. 
Coalitional matchings
A coalitional matching is a mapping µ defined on R ∪ S which satisfies for all r ∈ R and s ∈ S :
(
In what follows, we write
Notice that each coalitional matching µ induces a partition Π
} is a partition of S into student groups (both partitions being induced by µ).
We say that a pair (A, µ ), where A ⊆ R ∪ S and µ is a coalitional matching, is blocking µ if
Thus, the pair (A, µ ) is blocking µ if each agent in A strictly prefers his corresponding match under µ (which contains only agents belonging to A) over his match under µ. A coalitional matching µ is core stable if it cannot be blocked.
Own-sided priorities
We start our analysis by assuming that agents' preferences over universities are mainly shaped by the corresponding primitive preferences over groups on agents' own market side. For the first domain (D 1 ) these primitive preferences dictate the overall preferences, while for for the second domain (D 2 ) the primitive preferences over groups on the opposite market side also play a role. We have the following formal definitions.
It is easy to see from the definitions of these two preference domains that a necessary condition for the existence of a core stable coalitional matching
The nonemptiness of the cores of these two coalition formation games turns out to be also a sufficient condition when the domain is D 1 . 
The main reason for this result is that when research teams and student groups from two corresponding core stable partitions are matched, then the agent set in a blocking pair contains, along with an agent, also his coalition from the corresponding core stable partition. This fact, together with the properties of the preference domain, allows us to replace coalitions by players and then identify a stable matching in the corresponding standard two-sided matching problem. In turn, this stable matching induces in a natural way a core stable coalitional matching.
Same-sided priorities
Assume next that researchers' and students' preferences over groups on one and the same market side shape in a crucial way their overall preferences over universities. The domain D 3 displays a situation where both researchers and students pay attention only to the research teams they can work in or learn from, respectively. In the domain D 4 priority is given again to research teams but, in case an agent is indifferent between two research teams, the overall preference over universities follows the corresponding primitive preference over student groups.
Given the focus of agents' induced preferences in these two domains, it is again easy to see that a necessary condition for the existence of a core stable coalitional matching µ is that Π µ R ∈ Core R, ( T r ) r∈R . As it turns out, the existence of a core stable partition for the research team formation game is also a sufficient condition when the domain is D 3 . 
Theorem 3 Let
( i ) i∈R∪S ∈ D 3 .
Opposite-sided priorities
Finally, we consider a situation where the primitive preferences over groups from the opposite market side play the leading role in agents' overall preferences: for D 5 , this leading role is a dictatorial one, while for D 6 agents' primitive preferences over groups from their own market side are also taken into account.
Notice that the properties of the corresponding hedonic games do not play any role when agents' preferences are in D 5 . 
Theorem 5 Let
( i ) i∈R∪S ∈ D 5 , T
∅.
There is no core stable coalitional matching when ( i ) i∈R∪S ∈ D 5 . First note that in any coalitional matching µ with µ( is blocked by the pair (A, µ ) with A = {r 3 , s 2 , s 3 } and µ (s 
Similarly, one can show that no other coalitional matching is core stable.
In view of the above example, we obtain the following result. 
Conclusion
The framework of coalitional matching enables us to study situations in which groups of agents are being formed on both sides of a market. It is recognized that an agent's preferences on either side of the market depend on his peers on the same side and on the identity of the agents with whom he is matched on the other side. In this context, we derive existence results for a number of possible lexicographic preference profiles. These results allow us to see more clearly the connections between, first, the ways in which agents' overall preferences are induced and, second, the outlined sufficient conditions. Given the existence of core stable partitions on one of the market sides and the existence of a totally balanced game on the other, we highlight the tradeoff between agents' preferences being strict 3 and satisfying a corresponding common ranking property.
The latter property is admittedly restrictive, however, quite realistic. For instance, we observe in many industries the emergence of official rankings participants or institutions. For example, academic attainment and standardized tests such as SAT, GRE, and GMAT are used to rank students for admissions to universities (see, among others, Balinski and Sönmez (1999)) and publication lists are used to rank researchers, and, subsequently, research centers (cf. Combes and Linnemer (2003) ). Worldwide rankings of academic institutions are produced in order to facilitate comparison between departments and happen to also facilitate academic job seekers (cf. Baltagi (2003) and Neary et al. (2003) ). Moreover, in many countries national university ranking tables are developed which are then used by governments to allocate research funds and prospective students in higher education (see, e.g., Dill and Soo (2005)).
Last, we would like to point out that to illustrate our concepts, throughout this paper, we have used the example of students and researchers forming universities. The proposed framework, however, has a wider applicability and can also be used to study, for instance, hospital formation by medical staff and patient groups, the way athletes and coaching teams form sport club, and how journals are made up by editorial boards and authors. ) s∈S = ∅ and we show that a core stable coalitional matching exists. In particular, we will show that the existence of such a matching follows from the existence of a stable matching in a standard two-sided matching problem as shown by Sotomayor (1996) . 
let ≥ r T k be a complete and transitive preference relation on Gale and Shapley (1962) and Sotomayor (1996) , a stable matching in this problem always exists.
Take now a stable matching ν in the two-sided matching problem described above. Notice that ν induces a coalitional matching µ Thus, we should have that µ r Π R (r) 2
∪ {∅} should hold for all s ∈ B and, in particular,
First consider the case when B ⊆ R. The analysis above implies that for some
, r Π R (r) prefers to stay alone than to be matched (as he is under ν) to s G m ) in contradiction to the fact that ν is stable for the above defined standard two-sided matching problem.
Next consider the case when B ⊆ S. The analysis above implies that for some 
to the fact that ν is stable for the above defined standard two-sided matching problem.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose first that Core R, ( 
